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Gregory: Arbitration of Grievances under Collective Labor Agreements

ARBITRATION OF GRIEVANCES UNDER
COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS
Charles 0. Gregory*
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

COLLECTIVE agreement is a series of provisions setting forth
the terms and conditions under which organized workers are
employed. These provisions arise from the bargaining process between
an employer and the union representing his employees. The worker
has no part in making this contract. The union selected by a majority
of the workers is the exclusive bargaining representative for all of
them, and the employer must not bargain directly with individual
workers.'
The only contract between an employer and each employee is the
individual contract of hire-a contract at will which the employee,
at least, may terminate on notice. Of course, the worker is hired for a
certain job. Into his individual contract are automatically incorporated
all of the rights secured in the collective agreement. 2 In the past if
a worker felt that the employer had denied him some right, he would
sue him at common law in a state court for breach of contract.8 While
the worker himself would bring the action, the union would have
an interest in the way the contract was interpreted and applied.
Collective agreements usually create two kinds of rights. Most of
these rights involve individual terms of employment such as wages
and hours, seniority affecting layoffs and promotions, paid holidays,
vacations and the like. Other rights cover matters of concern only to
unions. These rights include the union or agency shop, the dues
checkoff, union recognition and no contracting out work, arbitration
clauses and the like. These matters are promises to unions, as such,
and do not become part of individual hiring contracts. Some collective
agreements may include provisions for the benefit of the employer.
The most important is the no-strike clause, i.e., a union promise not
to strike during the life of the contract.

A

John B. Minor Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B. 1924, Yale Univcrslty;
LL.B. 1926, Yale Law School. Solicitor of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor, 1936.37.
Member, Connecticut and New York Bars. John A. Sibley Lecturer in Law, University
of Georgia, 1965.
1 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
2 Ibid.
3 See GRiEORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 445-52 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
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ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEzENTS

Although individual workers at common law sued in court to enforce terms and conditions of employment, unions would sue to
enforce provisions such as the union shop and dues checkoff.' But
many collective agreements have for some time had grievance procedures and arbitration. An individual worker who thought the employer
had not lived up to the contract would file a grievance, and the employer and union representatives would then try to settle. Any grievance remaining unsettled could be taken to arbitration. While under
the common law a union could not compel an employer to arbitrate,5
a few states have statutes compelling compliance with agreements to
arbitrate; but until recently no federal law did so. Where grievance
arbitration was used, it got results. But arbitration was never a real
solution as long as the employer could refuse to arbitrate except when
he thought it was appropriate.
What is this arbitration? It is an ancient device long used by merchants to settle differences among themselves. To avoid the expense
and delay of litigation, they would submit their dispute to a neutral
merchant. After an informal hearing, he gave an award usually based
on custom and usage. If the losing party did not comply, a court
would enforce the award.
For a long time unions and employers were suspicious of the process
of arbitration. They thought of compulsory arbitration as a method
of suppressing strikes and forcing settlements. Employers disliked
strikes, but they hated the idea of some outsider setting wage rates
and other money items affecting employment. That is why most attempts to introduce compulsory arbitration have failed. However,
occasionally when a union and an employer reach a deadlock on one
or more items and neither wants a strike, they agree to submit these
matters to arbitration. They offer conflicting testimony of wage rates
prevailing elsewhere, cost of living figures, etc. The arbitrator makes

findings and issues his award. This process of judgment is chiefly
guess work. The arbitrator here is a substitute for a strike. The responsibility is terrific. During a war or national emergency, there is
some justification for this sort of thing. However, parties who voluntarily let some outsider set the terms of their agreement deserve what
4 See, e.g., Harper v. Local 520, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 48 SAV.2d 1033
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
5 Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements. 17 U. CH. L.
Ray. 233 (1950).
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they get. But at least they have done it by mutual consent in order to
avoid the rigors of a strike.
Far more important, however, is grievance arbitration. Here the
arbitrator has a standard to follow-the agreement fixed by the parties.
He applies these standards against the background of industrial practices and his own experience. The issue submitted usually is whether
or not the employer correctly applied the contract to the case in hand.
In contract construction cases the parties usually agree on the facts,
and then they argue about the meaning of the contract. It is most
informally handled-sometimes with lawyers but frequently without.
The issue could be paying for overtime, assignments of work, job
preference, promotion, vacation credit, layoff and recall, or other
conditions of employment. The arbitrator interprets the relevant provisions of the contract and applies them to the case before him in
written awards. He acts something like a judge, and the law he applies
is the contract made by the parties themselves. The whole process
is speedy and much cheaper than litigation in the courts.
301(a) ON ARBITRATION
After this prosaic account you must wonder what novelty has occurred-how over-all federal labor policy is involved. The new trend
is toward control by the union over contract enforcement-the collectivization of employee interests and submerging the individual
worker's rights in something called the majority rule. Today an organized employer must bargain solely with the union. The employer and
union alone bargain out the terms of employment for all the workers.
This is the majority rule. A worker may vote against any union at all
when the issue still is whether or not to have one, but once a majority
of the workers have chosen a union, each worker must either put up
with it or go elsewhere for employment. While this is accepted federal
labor policy, the law creating this federal policy in 19350 did nothing
about enforcing collective agreements. That was left to the states
to handle in law suits by individual employees.
Then in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act Congress passed section 301(a).
This is what has caused all the commotion. In effect, section 301(a)
says: 7 Suits for violations of contracts between employers and unions
EFFEcr OF SEcTION

6 The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935).

7 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1964). Section 301(a) reads as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
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may be brought in federal district courts, without respect to the
amount involved or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
In 1947 nobody knew what this meant. It seemed only to give unions
legal status as contracting and litigating parties, and this is what
Justice Frankfurter declared in the 1955 Westinghouse case.8 He said
that suits for enforcement of collective agreements were still matters
for the state courts.
The Westinghouse case involved a union which sued the employer
in a federal court under section 301(a) to recover one day's back pay
for several thousand workers. Justice Frankfurter said that Congress
should have enabled unions to enforce collective agreements, but
he said that Congress had not intended to flood the federal courts
with litigation over employees' grievances. The only law available for
enforcing collective agreements was state common law. Under the Constitution these actions could not be brought in the federal courts
without diversity of citizenship. Unions couldn't sue to enforce the
uniquely personal contract rights of individual employees. Under
state law these workers would bring their own actions, and that's the
way Congress had left it.9
But look what happened two years later. In the 1957 Lincoln Mills0
case Justice Douglas came out with a plan far better than that of
unions suing in federal courts directly to enforce employees' rights.
The agreement in the Lincoln Mills case had a provision that all unsettled grievances arising under the contract would be arbitrated.
When the employer refused to arbitrate several unsettled grievances,
the union sued him under section 301(a) in a federal court to make
him do so.
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Ibid.
8 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. 'Westinghouse Elem Corp 348
US. 437 (1955).
9 However, the Supreme Court through Mr. justice Stewart gave official notice that
the Westinghouse case was overruled in this respect and that henceforth a union repre.
senting employees might sue under § 301-in specific conformance with the wording
of the second sentence of § 301(b), for that matter-to enforce the uniquely personal
rights of the employee-grievants. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
This second sentence reads: "Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States." Labor Management Relations Act (raft-Hartley Act) § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b)
(1964). See also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
10 TWUA v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448 (1957).
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The Supreme Court now held that section 301(a) created a federal
right to sue for breach of contract, and since the promise to arbitrate
was made to the union and did not involve a uniquely personal
right of employees, like wages, it let the union sue to enforce it. In
theory the Westinghouse case was still good law,11 but in practice
Lincoln Mills created a sure way for unions to litigate the unsettled
personal grievances of workers-that is, by arbitration. All you needed
for this result was a standard arbitration clause.
Justice Douglas guessed that all sorts of problems would arise under
section 301(a). He knew how sparse that provision's language was.
He no doubt foresaw a system of enforcing collective agreements by
unions alone, without the individual workers. The substantive law to
be applied in suits under section 301(a), said Douglas, "is federal
law which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws."'1 Most of this could come from the Wagner and TaftHartley Acts. The rest of it the federal courts would make up. As
Douglas said, "The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem."' 8 They might freely borrow
state common law; but if they do, it "will be absorbed as federal law
and will not be an independent source of private rights."'14 With this
breezy send-off Justice Douglas and the Court surely put grievance
arbitration on the map. Never has so much been read into so little
as section 301(a) actually contains.
Since then the Supreme Court has developed quite a body of law in
this area. Both state and federal courts may enforce collective agreements
under section 301(a), but they must apply the same law-and it is all
federal law. Whether or not the parties have agreed to submit unsettled
grievances to arbitration is matter for the courts to decide. And where
the agreement contains a standard arbitration clause (that is, an undertaking to arbitrate all unsettled issues arising under the contract
involving its interpretation and application) the federal judges will
enforce it. Many employers hate this ruling because they are afraid
some arbitrator will decide against them on an issue not covered by
the contract. This is what they would prefer: (1) have the judge
ascertain what the unsettled grievance involves, (2) read the contract
to see if any provision covers that subject, and (3) if there is none,
11 But see UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
12 TWUA v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
13 Id. at 457.
14 Ibid.
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then refuse to enforce the promise to arbitrate. But if this happened,
the judge would be taking over the arbitrator's job. For the arbitrator
is the one to say what the contract provisions mean.
Unions frequently complain about employers contracting out work.
An employer may suddenly decide to have an outside firm do all the
janitorial work, cafeteria and dining service, automobile and truck
repair, tool repair or toolmaking, or upkeep on laundry and safety
devices. Often this is cheaper and more efficient. But it means laying
off or terminating existing employees. Or an employer may let out a
contract to add a wing or to install a new type of heating or air conditioning. The union wants the maintenance employees to do this,
although it may mean hiring a lot of new people. The employer says
that these decisions are none of the union's business--that there is
nothing in the agreement forbidding him to contract out work. But
the union says that contracting out work (1) violates the union recognition clause, (2) negates provisions dealing with job classifications and
work assignments, and (3) threatens to destroy the traditional bargaining unit and eventually the union.
An employer actually retains control over everything that goes on in
his plant except for the concessions he has made in the agreement, and
if there is nothing in the agreement about contracting out, the employer is probably right. What the union claims may be arguable.
But an arbitrator is the man to draw the inferences either way. If
the union raises a grievance and wants to arbitrate it, under a standard clause, it looks as if the employer would have to arbitrate. 15
Suppose he can show that the union had bargained unsuccessfully
to prohibit contracting out. This would indicate that the union is
now using arbitration to get something it couldn't get by bargaining.
Nevertheless the employer must go through with it. He can protect
himself by insisting that the arbitration clause should expressly except
issues such as contracting out. Or he can insist that the agreement
15 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). The Court
here was dealing with a collective bargaining agreement which contained a standard
arbitration clause to the effect that disagreements over provisions of the contract would
be settled by arbitration and also a provision which stated that matters which are
strictly a function of management would not be subject to arbitration. The union
sued to compel arbitration of a grievance based upon the employer's practice of contracting out work while laying off employees who could have performed such work.
The employer argued that deciding whether to contract out work was strictly a function
of management, and hence not arguable. The Court decreed arbitration, holding that
the arbitrator would decide if contracting out was excluded from the arbitration clause.
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confine the grievance process and arbitration only to those provisions
dealing with specific terms and conditions of employment.' 0
Employers also dislike union attempts to get wage and rate adjustments by arbitration, and they complain bitterly if courts make them
arbitrate in this area. But some agreements do contemplate wage and
rate revisions by arbitration under certain circumstances. Whether a
particular agreement does or does not may be a matter of interpretation. If there is any doubt, the court must enforce the employer's
promise to arbitrate. Unless the arbitrator is incompetent, he will
dismiss any grievance where the union is trying to pull a fast one.
But the employer's surest protection is a contract provision that no
grievance concerning rates or wages shall be arbitrated. Then no judge
will compel arbitration on such matters.
Employers must become reconciled to arbitrating what appear to
be frivolous issues.17 For many of these are not frivolous to the employees pressing them. Indeed, unions often make silly grievances
appear to be plausible. It is far more healthy to process these cases
than to suppress them. For if they are silly and frivolous, any decent
arbitrator will dismiss them. In the meantime the result is educational
and it lets off steam. A refusal to arbitrate eventually builds up bitter
resentments.
To HAVE GRIEVANCE PROCESSED
The Supreme Court seems determined to make employees and
unions rely only on arbitration in enforcing agreements which provide
for grievance arbitration. 8 The question then becomes one of whether
the union is to have complete charge of the arbitration. I have already noted that the union has complete control in bargaining collective agreements. The employer and union may modify or dispose of
certain rights already accrued to employees. They may agree to abolish
certain jobs or to modify established seniority relations. The affected
employees may sue the union but will get nowhere if what the union
did was for the common good. A typical case is where two companies
merge, the employees of each being represented by the same union.
The union and the surviving company may agree to dove-tail the
RiGHT OF INDIVIDUAL

16 See United Steelworkers, supra note 15, at 584-85 (dicta); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (dicta); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960) (dicta). See also Crawford, The Arbitra.
tion of Disputes Over Subcontracting in CHALLENGES To ARnrrRAvroN 51 (1960).
17 See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
18 See "Steelworkers Trilogy" cases, supra note 16.
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seniority lists into a single one. If individual interests of employees
are adversely affected, that is just too bad.' 9 A union should even be
able to negotiate a wage decrease in order to keep a hard-pressed plant
from shutting down.
When an employee files a grievance, his union tries to negotiate a
settlement with the employer. This process is a phase of collective
bargaining. I believe the union should be free to settle this grievance
with the employer any way it sees fit. If the parties act in good faith,
such settlement should be binding on the grieving employee. - Hence
the employer should be able to plead it as a defense in a subsequent
law suit by the individual based on this complaint. I know that employers and unions occasionally "swap" grievances. That is, the
employer will agree to grant grievance A if the union agrees to withdraw grievance B. This might seem tough on the employee who filed
grievance B; but a strong case can be made for freedom to negotiate
in this manner.
The grievance procedure may well be an extension of collective
bargaining, but when the parties take an unsettled grievance to arbitration, we have something more judicial in nature. Certainly an
arbitrator should not try to mediate a settlement. The parties presumably want to know where they stand. They want an outsider's
interpretation of a contract provision. Or they want to know whether
certain discipline or a discharge was for just cause. Of course the
parties remain free to settle a matter in arbitration at any time during
its pendency or trial.
Suppose the employee wants to take his unsettled grievance to arbitration but the union refuses to do so. May the union conclude that his
grievance is without merit and not worth arbitrating? For that matter,
may a union refuse to process a grievance at all because in its opinion
it is without merit? From my recollection of some ridiculous grievances I have seen, I am sure that a great many absurd ones are filed.
For there are a lot of Philadelphia lawyers among American workers.
Certainly I think the union should have complete control over the
arbitration process, even if individual rights of employees are sub19 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffznan, 345 US.
330 (1953). But see, e.g., Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), on rehearing,
327 U.S. 661 (1946). See generally FxLETrNG, THE LnoR ARnmxrrAo. Pnocss 115-20

(1965).
20 See Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
826 (1963); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961); FzxfN.c, op. cif.
supra note 19, at ch. IV. But see Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley. supra note 19.
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merged in the collective interest. A union should have the right to
screen all grievances. With silly and absurd grievances this is certainly
clear. What if the grievant files a claim depending on an interpretation of the contract which the union thinks is wrong? I think that the
union should not have to process this grievance. Or suppose that a
matter arises between two sets of workers. Whichever way it is decided,
one group wins and the other loses-and vice versa. Here again the
union alone should be free to decide what to do when these conflicting interpretations of the contract occur. Naturally the union will
adopt one version. Why should it also have to support the other?
People say that a union will process the grievances of members and
refuse to push those of non-members. This certainly would be very
bad. Actually, however, unions like to win new members by serving
workers who do not already belong.
If a union refuses to arbitrate a certain employee's grievance, should
that worker be allowed to arbitrate it himself with the employer? The
answer to this I think should be "No."' First of all, the employee
might press an interpretation of the contract which conflicts with the
union's version. How could the union be called on to finance this
separate arbitration? Also the employer never agreed to arbitrate with
an individual employee, and he does not want conflicting interpretations of the contract any more than the union does. The employer
must by law do business only with the union in making the original
contract. He should, therefore, be entitled to be free from the harassment of having to arbitrate with individual grievants. The Supreme
Court seems recently to have taken the first step in going much farther
than this. 22 Whenever arbitration is available, the employer should be
21 But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); Jenkins V.
Win. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1957). Donnelly and
Jenkins both involved a suit against the employer by an employee for damages for
wrongful discharge. The court stated in Jenkins that if the union acted arbitrarily and
in a discriminatory manner in refusing to press the plaintiff's grievance to arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement, then the employee himself is entitled to
sue. In Donnelly the court held that if the union refuses to pursue grievance procedure
for whatever reason, the employee could then negotiate with this employer, and If tile
employer refuses to cooperate through the grievance procedure, then the employee
could sue for damages or specific performance of the grievance procedure. See also
Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50
CoLuM. L. REV. 731 (1950).
22 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Haynes v. United States Pipe
& Foundry Co., 62 L.R.R.M. 2389 (5th Cir. 1966). In Republic Steel an employee sued
Republic Steel Corp., his employer, for severance pay. Prior thereto he had made no
effort to utilize the three step grievance procedure set out in the collective bargaining
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allowed to plead this as a bar to any court action by the individual
employee. The employee should seek his remedy in arbitration
through the union. Naturally the individual employee may sue the
employer in court where there is no arbitration clause. Also, the
proviso to section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act allows individual employees to file grievances directly with employers and to
bargain settlements. 23 A representative of the union is then allowed
to be present to avoid an erroneous application of the contract. But
the section 9(a) proviso does not require the employer to settle. He
can make the employee grieve through the union by refusing to deal
with him.
Some say that under the majority rule, unions can ruthlessly trample
on the rights of individual employees,2 4 but this seems to be exaggerated. An employee may sue a union for damages if it dishonestly
refuses to represent him, and under the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act
the government affords protection of employees in similar cases. 2 5 But
the real test is union self-interest. The worker is always seeking a
remedy against some action by the employer. If this action were
really unjust, the union would act quickly. Actually, employers are
sometimes quite reasonable, although many employees may not think
so, and if the union agrees with what the employer has done, it was
probably proper in spite of the worker's complaint. Of course, the
employer and the union may conspire to get rid of an employee they
agreement which culminated in arbitration. The Court denied relief and held that an
employee must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure before resorting to
other modes of redress. Thus, the Court did not hold that the grievance procedure

was an exclusive means of redress.
23 Labor Management Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). The proviso

of this section reads as follows:
...
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract
or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative
has been given an opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Ibid.
24 See authorities cited note 21 supra.
25 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 101(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4)
(1964). This section states in part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective
of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or
respondents in such action or proceeding .....
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do not like. Such cases are taken care of by state and federal labor
relations boards. As such collusion is bad faith, the employee may sue
the union, but there is no way to arbitrate this sort of thing.
What has been said about subordinating the individual worker and
leaving the administration of collective agreements entirely to the
contracting parties has wide support from employers and unions. However, a few authorities have an uneasy feeling that this may precipitate injustice and amount to a denial of due process.20 Everyone
agrees that the parties-employer and union--create by bargaining
all of the rights the individual worker has in the first place. Everyone agrees that the parties by contract may determine in advance how
those rights will be enforced or administered. If the parties agree on
arbitration as the exclusive method of enforcing an individual's rights,
then recourse to suing in the courts should be denied. Everyone will
concede that the parties-employer and union-can agree by contract
that only they, and not the individual, shall participate in disposing
of grievances, but if the individual worker is completely squeezed out,
all do not agree that the Supreme Court or even state courts will not
intercede and allow the individual to sue in court because he was
denied due process in the arbitration forum.
Of course, if Congress passed a statute allowing employers and
unions to agree (1) that only they would participate in arbitrating
grievances, and (2) that at any time they were free by agreement to
dispose of pending grievances involving employees' rights, then the
Supreme Court would no doubt uphold this statute. It would not let
dissatisfied employees take these matters to the courts. But Congress
has not said this. Indeed, one way of reading the section 9(a) proviso
in Taft-Hartley is that every individual employee has a right to file
and prosecute a grievance directly with the employer. And there are
those who believe that if the parties always exclude individuals from
arbitration, they may run into trouble.
Take a simple case. A job falls open because its incumbent retires.
The Company promotes employee A into the job. Employees B and C
both want the job and think they are entitled to it. All three employees, A, B and C, are unit workers represented by the union. Here
the union and the employer may agree that A is the man entitled to
the job. Is the union obliged to prosecute B's and/or C's grievances
and compelled to press an interpretation of the agreement with
26

See authorities cited note 21 supra.
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which it does not agree? It can't very well prosecute both grievances
at the same time. Or, possibly, the union may think that B's claim is
best. Are A and C to be left out in the cold? If the matter goes to
arbitration, has C a right to be heard individually? How about A?
Or suppose employee X is discharged by the employer, and the union
refuses to process his grievance because it thinks X should have been
fired. May X insist that he himself is free to arbitrate the case with
the employer?
In my opinion the union ought to have the last word about whether
or not an employee's grievance should be processed. But a few people
in the labor relations field believe that an individual worker whom
the union is not representing directly in a grievance and arbitration
has a right to intervene and be heard. In effect, they would make the
grievance procedure and arbitration a tripartite affair in these unusual cases where an employer and a union are processing a grievance
which directly affects an employee not represented in the grievance
machinery by the union.27 Of course, that raises the matter of who
will pay for the arbitration? If it goes this far, the individual employee should share it equally with the employer. But some believe
that it should be on a one-third each basis. Then comes the question:
Who is going to pay the arbitrator for the individual employee's share
if he has no money?28 Any such arrangement would have to be worked
out by the employer and the union in a collective agreement. Naturally employers and unions would not want this sort of thing at all.
The whole conception is a headache. But unless Congress expressly
allows the complete eclipse of the individual employee and expressly
institutionalizes his rights, there is always the chance that state and
federal courts will let him intervene. These courts may set aside
awards in arbitration proceedings where individuals were not allowed
to participate, or may let them sue in court where they are not allowed to arbitrate their rights with the employer. These results would
be much bigger headaches. It seems crazy to let individuals in this way
27 See Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The Carey Decision and
Trilateral Arbitration of JurisdictionalDisputes, 11 U.C.LA.L. REv. 327 (1964); Jones,
Power iand Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Some Hypotheses,
11 U.CJ-.AL. REv. 675 (1964); Jones, Autobiography of a Decision: The Function of
Innovation in Labor Arbitration and the National Steel Orders of joinder and Interpleader, 10 U.CJ.LA.L. REv. 987 (1963). See also Bernstein, Nudging and Shoving All
Parties to a JurisdictionalDispute Into Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of National
Steel, 78 HARv. L. REv. 784 (1965); Jones, On Nudging and Shoving the National Steel
Arbitration Into a Dubious Procedure, 79 HAIv. L REv. 327 (1965).
28 See FLoEmNG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 127.
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upset the patterns evolved between employers and unions who are
compelled by law to deal with each other. But allowing individuals
to be notified and heard-giving them their day in court, so to speakmay prove to be a small price to pay in the long run to prevent the
disruption of the evolving institutional pattern of collective bargaining and arbitration.
ARBITRATION CASES

Here are some cases that have puzzled arbitrators. With plant expansion, an employer elevates unit employees to become foremen.
When business later declines, he lays off half of his employees and
demotes these foremen back to unit jobs, back in their old slots, as
if they had gone on accumulating seniority while they were foremen.
The unit employees who are laid off to make rom for them file grievances. They and the union contend that the demoted foremen cannot
accumulate seniority outside the bargaining unit. Some say they lost
it all when they became foremen. In one such case the arbitrator
agreed with the union. So the demoted foremen went way down the
seniority ladder-some of them out on the sidewalk. They then sued
the employer and the union to have this arbitration award set aside
because they had not been made parties to the case. Of course they
had known all about it, and the employer had represented their interests, fighting tooth and nail to keep them where he had put them
on the seniority ladder. The Wisconsin Supreme Court-I think
wrongly-set aside this arbitration award. 29 Naturally these demoted
foremen, by that time members of the bargaining unit and thus generally represented by the union for bargaining purposes, were not
supported by the union at the arbitration. The union had to choose
between two interpretations of the contract, and in affirming one
it had to deny another. Suppose the union had agreed in good faith
with the company. Could the unit men displaced by the demoted foremen have made the union arbitrate? Or suppose the company had
agreed with the union in the first place, not allowing seniority to
accumulate while the demoted foremen were supervisors. Could
those employees have done anything about this? Under the majority
rule principle the answer should be "No" as long as the union and
employer act in good faith. We may not like this suppression of the
29 Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.WA.2d 132 (1959); see FLEMNG,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 110, 119. See also Freedman v. Maritime Union, 58 L.R.R.M.
2605 (D.N.Y. 1964).
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individual. But if you are going to have labor unions at all, there
is no place in bargaining and arbitration for individuals. I might
quickly add that in most cases like this one, arbitrators have upheld
the employers' action. Would it not be shocking if the adversely affected unit employees could challenge this in court?
Many arbitration cases involve discipline, discharges or penalty layoffs for alleged misbehavior. The relevant contract language is usually
quite simple. The parties agree that the employer may discipline or
discharge any employee for just or proper cause. Sometimes there are
plant rules, with stated penalties for infractions. While such rules
now and then appear in collective agreements, the employer usually
promulgates them unilaterally. But even without such rules, penalties
are imposed for conduct on company time and property such as fighting, stealing, drinking or selling liquor, gambling, soliciting union
membership, sleeping on the job, sexual immorality, horseplay, swearing, insubordination-you name it and there are cases about it.
Of course, just cause is an amorphous concept; but custom and
common sense give it definition. The toughest job here is to find out
what happened. Then you decide whether or not it was just cause
for discipline. The parties' witnesses often tell inconsistent stories; and
the arbitrator has to sift out the truth. Sometimes the witnesses of
one side or the other are deliberately lying-you cannot always be
sure which ones are telling the truth. More often where there are
inconsistent stories nobody is lying because the witnesses obviously
believe what they say. Yet they can't both be right. So you do the
best you can.
Fighting among employees on company property is certainly good
cause for discharge. But there are occasional exceptions. Suppose the
supervisor knew that an employee was the butt of systematic horseplay over several weeks, but did nothing to stop it. Somebody goads
him too far once too often and he lights out and hits his tormentor.
Perhaps he should be discharged. But I had a case where I thought the
circumstances indicated otherwise. Then there was a forelady who
not only precipitated a crisis between two employees at a coffee break
but walked out on it when she could, and should, have stopped it.
When the female grievant was fired for slapping a man who made
an extremely rude remark to her, I reinstated her-without back pay.
But fighting almost always is and should be good cause for discharge,
even when fellow employees provoke it. Otherwise you could hardly
run a plant.
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Stealing company property such as hams and meat from a packinghouse, or tools and material from a mill is good cause for discharge.
But even here I have seen some strange awards. Some arbitrators
apply the standard used in criminal cases, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they reinstate employees who were almost certainly
guilty, just because when they were prosecuted criminally, a jury refused to convict them. However, in my opinion if the proof of guilt
is convincing on the preponderance of the evidence, the discharge
should be upheld. Why should a jury's verdict bind the arbitrator
in an arbitration case? Of course, discharge is serious; but the grievant's personal freedom is not at stake in an arbitration case as it is
in a criminal trial.
May an employer discharge or discipline an employee for conduct
outside company property, on the employee's own time? Suppose an
employee is arrested in a gambling raid or is convicted of criminal
negligence in a highway accident, perhaps drunken driving. These
things have nothing to do with his work. And his absence from work
because he is in jail or being tried may not justify his discharge; he
also could have been absent because of sickness or a death in the
family. These things happen. Suppose he was arrested for statutory
rape or contributing to the delinquency of a young boy. Again, these
things have nothing to do with his work. Indeed, his work record may
be perfect. Of course you may not want this sort of person around
the plant, or works, or department store or whatever it may be, and
circumstances may make their retention intolerable. Most arbitrators
would probably not regard these matters, certainly not first offenses,
as just grounds for discharge in factories, mills and mines. Where
direct customer or other intimate personal contacts occur, you might
expect a different result.
If an employee fought outside the plant on his own time, this would
not be regarded as just cause for his discharge. Suppose the fight was
with a fellow worker. Would that make any difference? I doubt it.
Suppose an employee beat up his foreman outside the plant. If the
fight had something to do with their work and relations at the plant,
his discharge would be upheld. Otherwise foremen would lose all
authority they had at the plant. But if the fight was over politics or
anything unrelated to their work, it would be different.
In one famous case two young women employees dropped into a
tavern for a beer at the end of the 3 to 11 P.M. shift. At the next
table sat their department superintendent and general foreman. They
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then sat together to have a few more. One thing led to another and
the party ended up in a nearby motel. Next day none of them showed
up for work. The plant manager got suspicious and fired all four of
them when he discovered the truth. The superintendent and foreman were through. They had no union to intercede for them. But
the union pushed the girls' grievances to arbitration. This plant employed around 500 women; and the company insisted that incidents
like this would make it hard for them in the future to hire young
women because these two girls by their conduct had marred the
image of the company in the community. This was a poser for the
arbitrator. To get their consensus on the company's contention, he
arranged private interviews with some of the women employees, every
10th one alphabetically on the payroll. All of them knew about the
case, and only two of them agreed with the company. On this basis,
the arbitrator found no just cause for discharge and reinstated the
girls.
One other discharge case will be discussed, since it shows how some
parties choose arbitrators. Ordinarily unions are suspicious of arbitrators proposed by employers and vice versa. All arbitrators are on
somebody's blacklist. As a rule, however, the parties finally agree on
a neutral arbitrator. If they can't, they ask the American Arbitration
Association or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for
lists from which they try to pick a name. If that doesn't work, they
may ask the agency itself or some judge to name an arbitrator.
Years ago I had a discharge case at a small mid-west packing plant.
I met the parties at a hotel conference room on a hot summer
morning. I opened the hearing and the union spokesman told me
that I was the company's arbitrator-that the union did not want me
but was stuck with me. This was completely novel, and I asked why.
Well, it seems that the company's discharge of the grievant triggered
a strike, and the only way they could settle the strike was by agreeing
to have the discharge arbitrated. But the parties could not agree on
an arbitrator. Somebody came up with this solution. They agreed that
some agency be asked for a list of fifteen arbitrators' names. They
would then flip a half dollar. The party that lost the toss could name
the agency and the winning party could choose any one from the
fifteen names submitted. Losing the toss, the union named the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the company as winner took
my name from the fifteen submitted. Being still irritated, I asked the
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union what they had against me. I was told that they had heard I
was tough in discharge cases. This is what the case involved.
It seems that under the contract three unexcused absences were
good cause for discharge. The grievant had had three unexcused absences-so he was discharged. But this meant three unexcused absences
during the life of the agreement, which was one year. As often happens, this agreement had an automatic renewal clause. If at the end
of the year neither party had "opened" the contract for further bargaining, it automatically renewed itself. Now after the grievant was
discharged, they discovered that his third unexcused absence had occurred during the new contract year, so that he still had another such
absence coming with no questions asked. Right there the employer
should have given in. But no, he then claimed a new reason for the
discharge-that the grievant was a homosexual. Actually the company
had no evidence at all to back up its charge, and I reinstated the
grievant.
The hardest arbitrations require the interpretation and application of complicated and ambiguous clauses in collective agreements.
They may have to do with all sorts of seniority matters, including
layoffs, bumping, promotions and returning supervisory employees
to the unit. Some involve adjusting incentive and other wage rates
when the employer changes job content and production techniques.
Critical issues involve scheduling, paid holidays and vacation credit,
distribution of and paying for overtime work at premium ratesliterally hundreds of details that occur from day to day. It is hard
to exaggerate the number of issues that result from the clash of
workers' wants with management's determination and need to manage.
Obviously the provisions of collective agreements cannot possibly anticipate and cover in advance many of these differences. When these
matters go to arbitration, the arbitrator has to dispose of them in accordance with the words of the contract.
But there are large gaps in the contract. The task of the arbitrator
is delicate, indeed. Is his function really to keep everybody happy?
Should he proceed to fill in these gaps the way he thinks they should
have been filled? It is so easy to say that his job is to apply the contract as it is and that he must not add to or subtract from it. But his
job is also to ascertain and fulfill the intent of the parties. If this
means applying the contract language to fact situations neither party
had had in mind, then that is what he must do. Our courts have
been doing this with the Constitution and statutes for a long time
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now. I once had to interpret ambiguous language which I suspected
the parties had deliberately left ambiguous. Indeed, they admitted
that such was the case because they could get no closer in bargaining.
What should I do? Well, I read it to mean what in common sense I
thought it should mean in context. And the result was fine.
This process of arbitration is just getting established as a device for
the administration and enforcement of collective agreements-documents which are growing larger, more comprehensive and more detailed each year.30 As their provisions tend to become standardized,
we may develop through arbitration an industrial common law using
general principles, rules and precedents instead of floundering around
in a comparative wilderness of single instances. But this whole subject
is huge and is still expanding rapidly. Under the guidance of a developing national labor policy the federal judiciary will no doubt
eventually achieve a trustworthy and effective institution of grievance
arbitration-far more so than anything we have as yet.3 '
See FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 19.
31 But see HAYs, LABOR ARwrrA-TIoN: A DiSSENmG Vmw (1965). Judge Hays! thesis
has been blasted by reputable arbitrators such as Saul Wallen in 60 LRR 167 (Nov. 8.
1965) responding to Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YA.E L.J. 1019 (1965).
While he was still a professor at Columbia Law School Judge Hays disagreed bitterly
30

with the US. Supreme Court's "Steelworkers Trilogy," the three cases referred to in
note 16 supra. See Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law: October Term. 1959, 60

CoLutm. L. REv. 901, 919-55 (1960). Of course, there are undoubtedly some crooked or
incompetent labor arbitrators, just as there undoubtedly are and certainly have been
in the past some crooked or incompetent judges, on both state and federal benches.
But by now I would suppose that most people familiar with the field of labor relations
would acknowledge that labor arbitrators are better fitted to administer collective agreements than are most federal judges. Nonetheless, many of us arbitrators regret Judge
Hays' intemperate attack on the Supreme Court, on the institution of labor arbitration,
and on us-the arbitrators; and we feel sorry that he felt obligated to take such an
exaggerated and better view of labor arbitration itself and of labor arbitrators in general.
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